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Abstract—Grid computing systems are complex and dynamic 
systems and therefore require appropriate automated 
management, which would enable stable and reliable operation of 
the whole grid environment. The research community has 
addressed this requirement with a number of monitoring 
frameworks, which serve to collect data at various levels to 
support decision taking and management activities within grids. 
However, these existing solutions seem to implement little 
support for collecting security-related data and enforcing 
appropriate security policies and constraints in this respect. With 
an increasing role of network connections and users remotely 
accessing computational resources from various locations, grid 
systems are no longer seen as localised and isolated ecosystems, 
but are coming to be more open and distributed. In this light, it is 
becoming more and more important to enable monitoring 
framework with capabilities to collect security-related data and 
check whether these observations comply with certain security 
constraints. Accordingly, this paper presents a survey of existing 
grid monitoring systems with a goal to identify an existing gap of 
insufficient support for handling the security dimension in grids. 
The survey suggests that available grid monitoring frameworks 
are incapable of collecting security-related data metrics and 
evaluating them against a set of security policies. As a first step 
towards addressing this issue, the paper outlines several groups 
of security policies, which the authors expect to be further 
incorporated in their own research work, and by the wider 
community. 
Keywords—Grid; Grid computing; Monitoring System; Security 
policy; Policy enforcement; Survey. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Grid systems are traditionally seen as computational 
clusters, which serve to provide universal and steady access to 
the pool of resources, including computational power, data 
storage space, software support for deploying and running 
intensive computations, data analysis, etc. [1]. To a great 
extent, user interaction with a grid system is automated, and 
grid resources are allocated and provisioned automatically. It 
means that users are enabled to remotely access grid systems, 
run their computations or store their data themselves, avoiding 
interaction with the grid administrator. Moreover, grid users 
are also typically exempted from the underlying routines of 
handling task fragmentation and distribution, scheduling, data 
integrity checking, etc. All these background jobs are expected 
to be handled by the grid in a completely automated manner. 
This flexible functionality, however, requires constant 
automated control and supervision to be executed by the grid 
administrators so as to support stable operation of the managed 
grid ecosystem. This in turn requires employing appropriate 
data collection and monitoring mechanisms, which would 
provide sufficient information for the interested party to take 
necessary actions. Broadly speaking, monitoring can be 
defined as a process of systematic collection of information 
about the current and past status of resources that are relevant 
in a particular scenario [2]. In the context of grid systems, 
which are characterised by their dynamic and complex nature, 
monitoring has become a particularly important task, which 
serves as a basis for providing reliable and cohesive services to 
users [3]. Since the emergence of grid computing, enabling 
automated monitoring capabilities has been identified as one of 
the key challenges and attracted attention and efforts both from 
the academia and the industry. 
As a result, to date, grid computing in general and grid 
monitoring systems in particular have reached a considerable 
level of maturity. Moreover, grid computing is frequently seen 
as a precursor to cloud computing, which also results in 
employing already existing grid monitoring solutions to the 
emerging domain of cloud computing. For example, the two 
fundamental characteristics of cloud computing [4] – elasticity 
and load balancing – are supported by prompt and timely 
monitoring of the underlying infrastructure resources. These 
monitoring mechanisms were not developed from scratch, but 
rather relied on already existing, highly optimised and reliable 
solutions originating from the grid computing research. 
Another recent extension to grid computing – namely, 
mobile grid computing [5] – can also potentially benefit from 
employing already existing techniques. Mobile grid computing 
is an emerging computing paradigm, which lies at the 
intersection of two research areas – namely, grid computing 
and mobile computing [5]. Its main concept is to extend the 
traditional capabilities of grids – that is, provisioning of a large 
pool of aggregated computational and storage resources in 
order to address computationally intensive tasks [6] – with 
computational capabilities of mobile devices over the network. 
From this perspective, mobile grid computing can be seen as an 
evolution of the grid concept from traditional, on-premises 
deployments to a distributed computing architecture, consisting 
of both computational clusters residing in a data centre and 
multiple mobile devices, such as smartphones, tablets and 
laptops, connected to the main cluster via a wireless network. 
The emergence of mobile grid computing poses new 
challenges as to how these distributed systems should be 
properly monitored and managed in terms of security and data 
privacy. As opposed to the traditional grid architectures, where 
networking is not regarded as one of the primary issues to take 
into account, in mobile grids the networking dimension starts 
playing a dominant role. The wireless nature of network 
connections introduces new threats and makes resulting mobile 
grid systems vulnerable to a wide range of malicious activities 
such as eavesdropping, data tampering and data tracing [7]. As 
it will be explained below, existing grid monitoring systems 
currently seem to be unable to support the security dimension. 
Accordingly, novel appropriate monitoring and detection 
mechanisms are required in order to address these security 
issues and enable (mobile) grid systems with sufficient self-
protective capabilities to maintain required quality of service 
(QoS). Primarily, such novel mechanisms are expected to be 
equipped with appropriate security policy checking and 
enforcement mechanisms – that is, with capabilities to check if 
collected security-related values are within the allowed 
constraints. 
Given these considerations, this paper provides a survey of 
existing grid monitoring systems with respect to an extent to 
which they support monitoring of security-related aspects. The 
survey results suggest that the security dimension is currently 
beyond the capabilities of the existing grid monitoring 
solutions. To address this identified gap, the paper outlines 
several important groups of security constraints, which would 
complement existing grid monitoring systems with the required 
support for monitoring security-related aspects and enforcing 
security policies. Moreover, these features are also expected to 
act as a reference for designing and developing the authors’ 
proposed grid monitoring system, which is enabled to support 
the security dimension in grids. 
Accordingly, the rest of the paper is organised as follows. 
Section II provides an overview of security aspects and the 
related vocabulary of terms in the context of grid computing, 
and also discusses the motivation behind the presented research 
in more details. Section III is dedicated to the actual survey of 
the existing grid monitoring systems. This section surveys 13 
different monitoring frameworks, paying special attention to 
their support for the security dimension. Section IV proceeds 
with a critical analysis of supported features in the examined 
grid monitoring systems, and identifies an existing gap related 
to insufficient support for enforcing security policies. Section 
V represents the authors’ initial results to introduce the security 
dimension in grid monitoring systems by outlining security 
policies, which can be potentially monitored and enforced in 
grid ecosystems. Section VI concludes the paper.  
II. MOTIVATION: ENABLING SECURITY IN GRIDS 
As defined by Foster et al. [8], a security policy is a set of 
rules that define security subjects (e.g., users), security objects 
(e.g., resources) and relations between them. In the context of 
grid computing, security policies are typically defined using 
the following terms, which serve to describe grid nodes, hosts, 
resources and communication channels [8]: 
• Subject is any entity, participating in a security operation. 
In grid computing environment, a subject is usually a user, 
a process operating on behalf of a user, a resource (e.g., 
file, computer, etc.), or a process working on behalf of a 
resource. 
• Credential is information which is used to verify the 
identity of a subject. Most common examples of 
credentials include passwords and certificates. 
• Authentication is the process by which a subject verifies its 
identity to a requestor, typically by providing its 
credentials. Authentication, in which both parties (i.e., the 
requestor and the authentication authority) authenticate 
themselves to each other at the same time is referred to as 
mutual authentication. 
• Object is a resource, which is consistently protected by the 
relevant security policy. 
• Authorisation is the method, which verifies whether a 
subject is permitted to access or use an object. 
• Trust domain is a logical, administrative structure, within 
which a particular security policy is applicable and holds. 
In other words, a trust domain is a set of subjects and 
objects ruled by a single administration body and one 
security policy. 
Using this vocabulary of terms related to security in grid 
environments, Foster et al. presented their Security Policy of 
Grid Computing and a reference architecture for implementing 
security-related aspects in grid systems [8]. This work 
established theoretical and practical foundations for designing 
and implementing grid environments in a secure, robust and 
reliable manner. The vision of implementing secure grids also 
depends on designing and implementing appropriate 
mechanisms and tools for executing continuous monitoring 
and control activities. Among other things, such activities may 
include authentication, authorisation and access control, 
intrusion detection, etc.  
For example, with an increasing number of users 
accessing the (mobile) grid resources, it is becoming a 
challenging task to monitor and ensure that users are 
authorised to access grid resources and run computations. 
From the grid provider’s perspective it is important to perform 
be aware of i) users’ access rights and resources to be 
accessed, ii) users’ current geo-location and connection type 
(i.e., a secure local connection or a far less secure and 
unreliable remote wireless connection), iii) the exact time at 
which users are accessing the grid (e.g., grid resources may be 
provisioned only during some periods based on the 
organisational policies), etc. These and other similar security-
related concerns have been taken as key criteria to survey 
existing grid monitoring systems and examine to what extent 
they support the security dimension. The next section proceeds 
with the results of the conducted study. 
III. ASSESSMENT OF AVAILABLE MONITORING SYSTEMS 
This section aims at identifying and surveying the most 
prominent and widely used monitoring frameworks specifically 
designed and developed to monitor grid computing systems. 
The surveyed monitoring frameworks are widely used for grid 
monitoring purposes all around the globe (with a particularly 
wide adoption in Europe). It is worth noting that the survey 
aims at providing a grid-focused view on monitoring tools, and 
explicitly omits (numerous) cloud-oriented approaches, which 
are driven by different requirements (e.g., SLA satisfaction, 
balancing physical and virtualised resources, application 
performance, business goals, etc.) and tend to provide a more 
high-level view on monitoring the internals of the system. 
Accordingly, in this survey, the main goal was to address 
the most relevant and important aspects of the existing grid 
monitoring frameworks. It has to be noted that due to space 
constraints the section only provides an overview, and refers 
the interested reader to a comprehensive study in [9], in which 
authors compare existing monitoring systems and classify them 
into application-, resource-, performance- and job status-
oriented approaches. Accordingly, based on this existing study 
13 grid monitoring systems have been identified, which are 
now considered in more details one by one in alphabetical 
order. The survey results are summarised in Table 1, whereas 
actual critical analysis and discussion of the survey results are 
provided in the following section of this paper. 
A. Ganglia 
 Ganglia1 is widely used in high-performance computing 
environments in order to primarily monitor computational 
resources [10]. Its main focus is on monitoring clusters, grids, 
and cloud infrastructures. Ganglia is based on carefully 
designed and engineered data structures and algorithms in 
order to achieve efficient monitoring of grid resources [9]. As 
claimed by its description, this system is highly optimised and 
advanced to be capable of monitoring clusters with more than 
50,000 running hosts. However, the application scope of 
Ganglia is limited – it is strictly targeted at monitoring 
resources, and typically neglects other important areas, 
including security. 
B. GridICE 
 GridICE2 was created at Istituto Nazionale di Fisica 
Nucleare (INFN) in the frame of the European DataTAG 
project [9]. It is a monitoring system, which facilitates the 
process of monitoring of scattered resources in grid 
architectures, and can be described as multi-dimensional 
monitoring framework as it is capable of capturing a wide 
range of monitored metrics. It is equipped with data collection 
capabilities to gather, aggregate and display the monitored data 
to the user. GridICE can be configured to aggregate collected 
data based on user requirements and specifications – for 
example, to monitor certain aspects of the grid virtual 
organisation or the grid operation centre. GridICE is enabled 
with detection and notification services, and can also capture 
network-related statistics. 
                                                          
1 http://ganglia.sourceforge.net/ 
2 http://sourceforge.net/projects/gridice/ 
C. GridMon (UK Grid Network Monitoring) 
GridMon3 is a grid network monitoring system which 
monitors network-related information, aggregates the collected 
data and displays it to the user [11]. The system is a collection 
of tools which can measure such metrics as connectivity, 
network performance, network jitter, packet loss rate, round 
trip time, and TCP and UDP throughput. GridMon was 
developed in the context of creating a connected grid 
infrastructure across the UK, and is not publicly available for 
download and usage [9]. 
D. GridRM 
 This is another monitoring system for networks which 
implements the Grid Monitoring Architecture (GMA). A 
GridRM [12] gateway is deployed on each grid site to access 
information regarding local grid resources. Equipped with a 
relational database, it is capable of collection data from other 
monitoring services (e.g. MDS) over the Simple Network 
Management Protocol (SNMP) and presenting this data to the 
users via standardised views. It also provides a Web-based user 
interface to access monitored data remotely and run custom 
queries to retrieve required aggregated information. 
E. G-PM/OCM-G 
 The OCM-G system [13] is a grid application monitoring 
framework, which offers online monitoring tools, configurable 
by the central manager, which orchestrates the monitoring 
process and passes monitoring requests to local monitoring 
agents. G-PM is a graphical extension to this system for visual 
performance analysis (in the form of charts, diagrams, etc.). It 
offers standard performance metrics and also supports creating 
user-defined custom metrics. 
F. HTCondor Hawkeye 
Hawkeye4 is a monitoring framework, which is capable of 
collecting and storing data, as well as incorporating 
information about other computer systems [14]. The Hawkeye 
system can be used to monitor individual servers, clusters of 
servers or whole data centres. The system is also equipped 
with a set of components to support data monitoring in an 
HTCondor computational group. 
G. MapCenter 
 MapCenter [15] is a flexible monitoring system, enabled 
with user interface to present and visualise run-time 
information on services and applications running on the grid. It 
relies on R-GMA to automatically collect data, and MDS for 
remote access over the network. It also supports dynamic 
discovery, based on efficient and transparent monitoring 
techniques, which enables rapid deployment of the MapCenter 
system in multiple grid environments. 
H. Monitoring and Discovery System (MDS) 
MDS5 is one of the most prominent monitoring 
frameworks widely used as a part of Globus Toolkit (GT) – a 
toolkit for building and managing grids – or independently. 
                                                          
3 http://gridmon.dl.ac.uk/gridmon/graph.html 
4 http://research.cs.wisc.edu/htcondor/ 
5 http://toolkit.globus.org/toolkit/mds/ 
Hierarchically structured, it enables management of static and 
dynamic information related to the current status of grid 
components. MDS provides an index service, which is used by 
managed grid systems to deliver collections of low-level data 
via a special registration protocol and caching mechanism so 
as to minimise the amount of non-stale data being transferred 
[16]. 
I. Mercury Grid Monitoring System 
Mercury6 was designed to meet the requirements of grid 
performance monitoring. It supports data monitoring and 
collection of metrics based on both pull and push models, and 
is targeted at controlling grid resources and applications in a 
scalable way. Mercury partially implements the GMA, and 
also follows a modular approach, which facilitates simplicity, 
proficiency, convenience and low insensitivity. 
J. Nagios 
Nagios7 [17] enables resource and application 
monitoring based on an extensible architecture. It offers 
various monitoring services such as monitoring of host 
resources (e.g., CPU/memory utilisation, response times, 
etc.) and monitoring of network services and protocols 
(e.g., SMTP, POP3, HTTP, PING etc.). 
K. R-GMA 
 R-GMA [18] is based on the GMA, which uses relational 
model for data storage. This allows the users the ability to run 
customised SQL-like queries to retrieve required information 
from the system. R-GMA also offers its users a global view on 
the grid system, including service availability and application 
monitoring [9]. 
L. Scalea-G 
 Scalea-G [19] is a generic performance analysis and 
monitoring system for grid systems. It implements the Open 
Grid Services Architecture8 (OGSA) and provides a setup for 
performance analysis and monitoring of various parameters 
belonging to network resources, computational resources and 
applications. Both push and pull data collection models are 
supported to enable scalable and flexible monitoring solution. 
Scalea-G also supports dynamic source code instrumentation to 
enable tracing and profiling of grid applications. 
M. visPerf 
visPerf [20] is another grid monitoring system, which 
supports visualisation of grid resources. This system uses 
agents which can extract necessary information from log files 
and/or can access the grid middleware API. Developed in the 
frame of GridSolve project9, it allows connecting to NetSolve 
servers for accessing system information for monitoring 
purposes. 
                                                          
6 http://www.lpds.sztaki.hu/mercury/ 
7 https://www.nagios.org/ 
8 http://toolkit.globus.org/ogsa/ 
9 http://icl.cs.utk.edu/netsolve/ 
IV. MONITORING SYSTEMS COMPARISON 
The results of the survey on grid monitoring frameworks 
are summarised in Table 1. This presented classification relies 
on a taxonomy, which includes 5 different dimensions (i.e. 
orientations) describing the monitoring activity, which may be 
supported by a particular monitoring system. Accordingly, if a 
framework supports particular type of monitoring, it is marked 
with a “+” sign; otherwise, it is marked with a “-” sign. 
The following list explains each of the dimensions in more 
details to help the reader understand the survey results: 
• Application-oriented monitoring targets at the internal 
behaviour of a grid application and/or its components, e.g. 
its memory usage or the execution time of a specific 
routine. 
• Job status-oriented monitoring is focussed on the execution 
status of a submitted job, rather than the actual application 
executing it. In its simplest form, such kind of monitoring is 
configured to check whether a job is still running, already 
completed or failed. 
• Resource-oriented monitoring handles data belonging to the 
infrastructure level of a grid ecosystem – that is, underlying 
hardware resources. In the first instance monitoring systems 
of this kind target at the overall utilisation of computing, 
storage and networking resources within a grid system. 
- Accordingly, computing resources refer to grid 
hardware resources, which are often seen as the key 
characteristic of grid computing, which, in the first 
instance, is expected to offer computing power to the 
user. Typically, to access these computing resources, 
users are required to deploy and run their own arbitrary 
applications, or, alternatively, grid systems allow 
configuring pre-deployed software with custom user 
data for further execution. 
- The second important element in grid resources is 
storage, which refers to hardware resources offered as 
services to enable users to store and retrieve arbitrary 
amounts of their data. 
- The networking resources are typically not directly 
exposed to the user, but nevertheless, it is important to 
monitor these resources, as it is a vital component, 
enabling the underlying communication between 
computing resources, storage resources, and the users’ 
remote computers. 
• Performance-oriented monitoring is intended to collect 
required information to determine the performance of the 
whole grid system or an individual application. As opposed 
to the application-oriented monitoring, it targets at 
collecting quantitative data, which will provide precise 
numeric values. In this respect, three monitoring 
techniques, used to collect this required information, can be 
identified. It is worth noting that these techniques are not 
mutually exclusive and are often used together to achieve 
better results. 
- Tracing is used to collect monitored events occurred 
during operation of the system and record them in a 
trace file. 
- Sampling is used to collect information by taking 
samples of the required measurings within pre-defined 
time intervals. 
- Profiling can be defined as the process of aggregating 
and filtering large amounts of (noisy) information, 
which serves to provide a more holistic and integrated 
view on the performance of the monitored system. 
• Security policy-oriented monitoring is the last but not the 
least aspect, which was taken into consideration when 
surveying existing grid monitoring systems. This type of 
monitoring serves to provide a wide range of information 
related to grid security (e.g., user access rights and 
privileges, remote access to the grid, state of the network, 
etc.), and check if the observed values comply with 
corresponding security policies. Examples of such policies 
include putting various kinds of constraints on jobs, users, 
geo-location, resources, etc. 
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Ganglia - - + + + + + - - 
GridICE - - + + - + + - - 
GridMon - - - - + + - - - 
GridRM - + + + + + - - - 
G-PM/OCM-G + - + - - + + - - 
HTCondor 
Hawkeye 
- - + + + - - + - 
MapCenter - - - - - + - - - 
MDS + + + + + + - + - 
Mercury + - + + + + + + - 
Nagios - - + + + + + - - 
R-GMA + + + + + + + + - 
Scalea-G + - + - + + + + - 
VisPerf - + + + + - - + - 
 
As it is seen from the table, existing grid monitoring 
approaches seem to support the four traditional dimensions 
(i.e., application-, job status-, resource, and performance-
oriented types of monitoring) to a lesser or greater extent. 
However, the situation changes when it comes to monitoring 
security-related aspects of a grid system and 
checking/enforcing associated security policies. The 
conducted survey suggests that existing systems were 
designed and implemented with little support for this 
important dimension, and tend to provide minimum 
capabilities to execute even simple security checks. 
The lack of support for checking security policies can be 
potentially explained by a number of reasons. First, grid 
computing has been historically associated with relatively 
localised deployments within a single data centre [21] (as 
opposed, for example, to a highly-distributed and network-
dependent cloud computing environments), where number of 
network connections was limited and stable, and, therefore, 
there was no real pressing demand for enforcing various 
security checks. Second, grid computing has never been seen 
as a commercial product to be offered to a wide range of 
customers [22]. They have been primarily serving scientific 
purposes, and therefore the number of users accessing grid 
resources is typically limited and easily controlled. This again 
did not require implementing sophisticated security 
monitoring mechanisms. The third reason is more pragmatic – 
since there was relatively little interest and support from the 
industry, which would drive and advance the security research 
in grids, research efforts focussed on more relevant issues. In 
this light, cloud computing can be seen as a representative 
example; it is a highly commercialised and industry-driven 
research area, where security and privacy have been admitted 
by the major market influencers to be the key preventing 
factor since the very emergence of clouds [23]. 
V. NEXT STEPS: TOWARDS MONITORING SECURITY 
POLICIES IN GRIDS 
Given the results of the survey, several considerations and 
suggestions can be drawn to create grid monitoring systems 
capable of capturing various security-related metrics and 
checking them against a set of predefined security policies. As 
it was already mentioned, a policy checking mechanism may 
rely on putting and checking a number of constraints, which, 
when violated, are supposed to indicate a potential security 
breach. Accordingly, below is a (non-exhaustive) list of 
desired security-related constraints for a monitoring 
framework, which are expected to have the potential to 
increase the overall security of grid ecosystems. 
• User-based constraints may serve to restrict access to the 
grid for specific users, limiting the number of users 
accessing grid resources simultaneously or the number of 
users from the same virtual organisation, etc. 
• Time-based constraints are intended to govern the exact 
time frame, during which users are allowed to access grid 
resources and execute their jobs. 
• Location-based constraints are required to restrict access 
to grid resources from specific remote locations. With the 
emergence of mobile grids, which are associated with a 
high number of temporary and potentially insecure 
connections, this feature is seen of paramount importance. 
• Resource-based constraints deal with checking the amount 
of resources allocated to individual users. These can be 
coarse-grained (e.g., number of computational nodes 
within a grid) or more fine-grained (e.g., number of 
parallel jobs to be executed, amount of CPU/memory 
resources within a single node, etc.). 
Accordingly, violation of the above-mentioned constraints 
leads to executing certain reactive actions so as to maintain the 
security and, as a consequence, stability of the grid ecosystem.  
Respectively, such reactive actions might include (temporary 
or permanent) access restrictions for specific users from 
specific locations at specific times to specific grid resources. 
These high-level guidelines are expected to act as a reference 
for devising a set of grid security policies and a corresponding 
policy enforcement mechanism. These two key components 
constitute the architecture of the future Grid Security Policy 
Monitoring System (GridSPMS) – a system, which is intended 
to address the identified gap of insufficient support of the 
security dimension in grid monitoring systems. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The central concern of this paper is the lack of appropriate 
mechanisms for monitoring the security dimension and 
enforcing respective security policies in grid environments. 
Despite the fact that considerable research efforts have been 
put into designing and implementing secure architectures for 
grids, corresponding grid monitoring frameworks seem to be 
incapable to incorporate the required security aspects. As 
suggested by the conducted survey of 13 existing grid 
monitoring frameworks, albeit they seem to successfully 
collect and analyse data at various levels, they are not designed 
to collect security-related data and, accordingly, check if it 
complies with certain security constraints. As a first step 
towards addressing this identified gap, a non-exhaustive list of 
potential security policies was outlined, which are expected to 
be incorporated by future grid monitoring frameworks. 
Moreover, these high-level guidelines serve to design and 
develop a framework, which will enable monitoring the 
security dimension in grids and enforcing corresponding 
security policies. Currently, the proposed GridSPMS is being 
implemented, and “work-in-progress” results are expected to 
be published in the near future. 
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